何波,张瀚文,王林玉,程胜.基于Hotelling模型的电商平台包装策略演化博弈研究[J].包装工程,2025,46(13):280-288.
HE Bo,ZHANG Hanwen,WANG Linyu,CHENG Sheng.Evolutionary Game Study of Packaging Strategy for E-commerce PlatformBased on Hotelling Model[J].Packaging Engineering,2025,46(13):280-288. |
| 基于Hotelling模型的电商平台包装策略演化博弈研究 |
| Evolutionary Game Study of Packaging Strategy for E-commerce PlatformBased on Hotelling Model |
| 投稿时间：2025-04-07 |
| DOI：10.19554/j.cnki.1001-3563.2025.13.031 |
| 中文关键词: 电商平台 包装策略 可循环包装 Hotelling模型 演化博弈 政府奖惩 |
| 英文关键词:e-commerce platform packaging strategy recyclable packaging Hotelling model evolutionary game government rewards and punishments |
| 基金项目:湖北省教育厅科学研究计划资助重点项目(D20211801) |
| 作者 | 单位 |
| 何波 | 湖北汽车工业学院，湖北 十堰 442002 |
| 张瀚文 | 湖北汽车工业学院，湖北 十堰 442002 |
| 王林玉 | 湖北汽车工业学院，湖北 十堰 442002 |
| 程胜 | 湖北汽车工业学院，湖北 十堰 442002 |
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| Author | Institution |
| HE Bo | Hubei University of Automotive Technology, Hubei Shiyan 442002, China |
| ZHANG Hanwen | Hubei University of Automotive Technology, Hubei Shiyan 442002, China |
| WANG Linyu | Hubei University of Automotive Technology, Hubei Shiyan 442002, China |
| CHENG Sheng | Hubei University of Automotive Technology, Hubei Shiyan 442002, China |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 目的 剖析出电商平台在采纳可循环包装策略过程中的博弈关系，揭示其策略选择的演化机制与路径，为推动包装绿色化和可持续发展提供有用参考。方法 基于Hotelling模型，提出4种包装策略组合情景，并构建2个寡头电商平台与政府之间的三方演化博弈模型，模拟各方在演化过程中的动态行为。运用Matlab软件进行数值仿真分析，探究关键影响因素对双寡头电商平台演化路径的影响。结果 博弈系统的最终稳定状态受到可循环包装所需投入的固定成本、市场竞争强度和政府奖惩力度等因素的显著影响。在不同参数区间下，系统会呈现多种演化稳定均衡。结论 电商平台通过优化运营体系及标准化管理，可以降低可循环包装的实施成本，从而提升整体净收益。政府通过合理有效的奖惩政策，并结合市场调控手段，可以激发电商平台采用可循环包装的积极性，加速可循环包装的推广应用，实现经济效益与环境效益的双赢。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| The work aims to analyze the game relationship between e-commerce platforms in the process of adopting recyclable packaging strategies, and reveal the evolution mechanism and path of their strategy choices, so as to provide a useful reference for promoting the greening and sustainable development of packaging. Based on the Hotelling model, four packaging strategy combination scenarios were proposed, and a three-party evolutionary game model between two oligopolistic e-commerce platforms and the government was constructed to simulate the dynamic behaviors of each party in the evolutionary process. Numerical simulation analysis was carried out using Matlab software to explore the influence of key influencing factors on the evolutionary path of the two oligopoly e-commerce platforms. The final stable state of the game system was significantly affected by the fixed cost of recyclable packaging, the intensity of market competition, and the strength of government incentives and penalties. The system presented a variety of evolutionary stable equilibrium under different parameter intervals. In conclusion, E-commerce platforms can reduce the implementation cost of recyclable packaging by optimizing the operation system and standardized management, thus improving the overall net income. The government can stimulate the enthusiasm of e-commerce platforms in adopting recyclable packaging through reasonable and effective incentive and punishment policies, combined with market regulation, to accelerate the popularization and application of recyclable packaging, and to achieve a win-win situation in terms of economic and environmental benefits. |
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